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The EU’s Central Asia strategy was 
introduced in 2007 in order to upgrade 
the EU’s cooperation with the five states 
of the region. The political context at that 
time was dominated by concerns in the 
EU over energy security and the war in 
Afghanistan. The strategy took a wide 
and comprehensive approach however, 
identifying a considerable number of priority 
actions (political dialogue, human rights 
and the rule of law, education, economic 
development, energy and transport links, 
environmental sustainability and water, 
common threats such as drug trafficking, 
etc). 
This approach has led to engagement in 
many dialogue procedures and projects. 
While there has been an undoubted increase 
in the level of activity, the extensiveness 
of the agenda and relatively low level 
of resources committed to the strategy 
entails a risk that the whole process may 
not have real impact and credibility. This 
risk is quite visible in most chapters of the 
strategy. For the time being it is felt by EU 
officials that these are early days still, and 
that results take time, and there has to be 
patience to deepen trust and experience in 
the region. Up to a point this may be valid. 
Yet there is a manifest need to sharpen 
the real operational objectives and raise 
the level of operations to the point of being 
demonstrably effective. 
Our shortlist of critical recommendations 
in this sense is divided into two categories 
– the strategic and general, and then the 
more specific and technical:
Strategic aspects:
1. Well into its third year of implementation, 
the EU would do well to engage in a critical 
review of the Strategy. The political process 
could be initiated by the current Spanish EU 
Council Presidency in the first half of 2010 
together with the new High Representative 
for foreign and security policy. A possible 
re-vamping of the strategy would be more 
appropriate in 2011 when the new External 
Action Service is in place. 
2. The EU has some clear security concerns 
in relation to Central Asia: energy supply 
security through diversification of sources, 
and linkages with Afghanistan (supply 
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logistics, political spillover risks, drug trafficking). All these 
security issues are quite rightly enumerated in the EU strategy 
and sit alongside the EU’s general branding of its foreign 
policy strategy as seeking to contribute to the development 
of a normative, rule-based world order with strong reliance 
on human rights, international law, regional cooperation and 
multilateral institutions. Contrary to certain debates, we do 
not see this as a conflict of interests versus values, as long 
as legitimate interests are pursued in a principled manner. 
However, Central Asia presents a real challenge in this regard, 
since the present state of governance in the region is so distant 
from these principles. This presents the EU with a choice: either 
to pass over its preferred principles in this case, or to make a 
special effort to apply its principled approach in ways that are 
realistically operational in this difficult political environment. 
The EU strategy struggles to pursue the second approach, 
but not without ambiguity. This report seeks to clarify and 
reinforce such an approach. To do this effectively is crucial for 
the credibility of the EU’s chosen role as a global actor working 
to promote a normative world order. A fuller discussion of the 
issues of principle is included at the end of this report. 
3. The case of Kazakhstan deserves special mention as a 
key country in the region that has chosen to reply to the EU 
strategy by adopting its own ‘Path to Europe’. Coupled with 
Kazakhstan’s new chairmanship in 2010 of the OSCE, this 
European orientation as part of a multi-vectored foreign policy 
presents an important opportunity for political and economic 
convergence with Europe, including deepening relations with 
the Council of Europe. These strategic directions have been 
announced, and the EU has also responded by agreeing to work 
towards a new treaty-level agreement with Kazakhstan. These 
developments are to be welcomed, but should be accompanied 
by clarity over the steps in the political sphere that Kazakhstan 
needs to make, progressively, for this to be a real movement 
beyond mere political declarations. If this succeeds it should 
have a wider demonstration effect elsewhere in Central Asia, 
which would be an achievement of strategic importance. In 
particular it is to be hoped that a positive momentum in EU 
relations with Uzbekistan becomes feasible.
4. The EU’s concept of regional cooperation in Central Asia 
needs revision. Intra-regional cooperation is surely desirable 
and the EU rightly tries to facilitate this. However it should not 
be over-emphasised in relation to opportunities for regional 
cooperation with neighbours external to the region (Eastern 
Europe, Russia, China and South Asia), and where the EU has 
several major interests (e.g. in energy, transport and security). 
The EU does work on this wider regionalism with projects to 
link Central Asia to its Eastern Partnership initiative, but with 
limited regard to the region’s Asian neighbours so far. Such 
elements of wider regional cooperation could help disenclave 
the land-locked Central Asia, and for the EU contribute to a 
wider ‘EurAsia strategy’ overarching and going beyond the 
several regional dimensions of the EU’s present neighbourhood 
policy. This wider EurAsian dimension, involving all the 
major powers of the EurAsian landmass, would fit in with the 
increasingly evident need to channel the new global multi-polar 
dynamics into an ordered world system. These considerations 
go well beyond concern for Central Asia alone, but the region 
is inevitably going to be at the cross-roads of many issues of 
global significance.  
Specific aspects:
5. The EU intends to increase its diplomatic presence in the 
region, and with the impetus of the new Lisbon Treaty provisions 
this needs to be done decisively, with adequately staffed EU 
delegations in all five states. It is already a positive feature of 
the Central Asia strategy that ways are being developed for 
individual member states of the EU to work more actively and 
synergetically with the Commission in the execution of various 
projects; to do this might seem obviously desirable, but it has 
not often been seen in practice so far. 
6. In the human rights field a structured process has been set 
up at both official and civil society levels. But this needs to be 
carefully upgraded, without which it risks becoming little more 
than a token routine of political convenience for both sides. 
Requests to make the process symmetrical, with dialogue on 
EU experience in managing difficult human rights issues, should 
receive a positive response. The interaction between the official 
dialogues and civil society seminars could be strengthened, 
with the civil society seminars invited to undertake regular 
year-to-year monitoring of progress in relations to appropriate 
benchmarks. Publication of the results and recommendations 
of civil society seminars is in principle being done, but these 
are not yet accessible on Commission websites. 
7. Concerning the rule of law initiative, it is too early to judge 
results since such work needs to be sustained over a long-
term period. We call for the formulation of clear and practical 
benchmarks to evaluate progress in this field in a public 
document setting out the EU’s priorities and strategies. The full 
development of this initiative is important as a values-driven 
commitment to the region, especially given the absence of an 
explicit democratisation agenda. 
8. The sanctions on Uzbekistan after the Andjian events in 2005 
did not yield substantial change and have now been lifted for 
the sake of engaging with the regime. If the EU should in future 
resort to such measures in Central Asia (or elsewhere) it has 
to be disciplined and unified. Naturally this is a topic that elicits 
a range of political positions in democracies such as the EU, 
but when the decision is made it has to be loyally backed by all, 
otherwise the operation and the EU itself is discredited. 
9. The Education Initiative so far mainly repackages existing 
programmes, but with a significant increase in funding, with both 
Tempus and Erasmus Mundus now to receive doubled funding 
from €5 to €10 million annually, the launch of a policy dialogue, 
and with the Bologna process serving to frame the reform of 
educational structures (notably in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan). 
This increased prioritisation of education within the total aid 
effort is to be welcomed. However, the Commission should now 
evaluate the first results of the Erasmus Mundus programme in 
the region, which seems not be adequately adapted to Central 
Asian realities, and undertake a broader education strategy 
review for Central Asia. Consideration should be given to other 
projects (examples are given below) with a view to a clearer 
branding of the EU as promoter of a cluster of high-quality and 
independent education and research institutions, as well as 
a supporter of reform of the basic education systems. There 
are also some changes in the management of the Education 
Initiative within the Commission that seem to be warranted. 
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10. In the area of water management and hydro-electric power 
there is a robust case for major investment in upstream states that 
could also bring huge benefits for downstream states, and avert 
the real risks of inter-state conflict over water. These risks are 
now heightened with the disintegration of the regional electricity 
grid. The EU is engaging in multiple initiatives in the area, 
ranging from the technical to political dialogue. This dialogue 
seems to remain rather general and superficial, however. While 
the EU is not in a position to lead on a resolution of the key water 
problem, it could help establish the technical-economic case 
for  investment in increased hydroelectric capacity that could 
offer benefits to both upstream and downstream states, outline 
the mechanisms for regional cooperation that would assure 
equitable implementation, and raise these issues at the top 
political level in alliance with major multilateral organisations. 
The EU should make available a special trust fund of grant 
resources for this purpose to enable the World Bank to draw 
up scenarios and cost-benefit calculations, in collaboration 
with the UN Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia 
and the Asian Development Bank. In any case there is also a 
large agenda for ‘no regrets’ investments in improved water 
management, modest-sized hydroelectric facilities and solar 
and wind renewable energies.
11. In the field of energy policy the EU is conducting wide-
ranging energy dialogues with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. 
The EU has a non-binding memorandum of understanding 
with Turkmenistan that envisages the purchase of gas, and 
this would fit into its Southern Corridor concept of diversifying 
gas supplies with a trans-Caspian link. The EU has indicated 
its support for the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, 
and should back this up in its energy policy dialogues and 
operational projects. While the EU has been debating various 
pipeline options for years, China has acted with great speed 
in constructing oil and gas pipelines across Central Asia. 
Meanwhile Iran also inaugurated a new pipeline to Turkmenistan 
that will increase the capacity of this southern export route. 
This is a classic example of how the EU and its member states 
have to negotiate and decide faster on elements of a common 
energy policy, or see the world leave it behind.
12. In the field of transport the EU’s present corridors and axes 
that extend east through or around Central Asia have become 
in part obsolete, and need to connect with the new trans-
continental Eurasian realities, east-west and north-south. The 
EU, and in particular the Commission’s transport department 
and the European Investment Bank, should communicate to 
the CAREC programme of the Asian Development Bank their 
willingness to enter into discussions to optimise the coherence 
of EU and CAREC transport corridors that do or could link 
Central and Eastern Asia with Europe; in addition there is a 
new US initiative (Northern Distribution Network) to develop 
supply routes from Baltic and Caspian sea ports to Afghanistan 
via Central Asia. The EU has both grant funded technical 
assistance and loan finance for infrastructural investments to 
support the development of agreed priority corridors. Since 
China, Russia and the US all have major stakes in various of 
these transport corridors, the case for explicit coordination is 
evident.
13. The main contribution to combating common security 
threats has been regional programmes for border management 
(BOMCA) and hard drugs (CADAP). These programmes 
could be further built upon, with some management changes. 
The BOMCA model might be applied to other parts of the 
security sectors in Central Asia to enhance effectiveness and 
good governance of police and security forces, at least in 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, possibly in cooperation 
with the OSCE and through the active involvement of key EU 
member states.
14. Concerning EU assistance, Brussels should consider 
focusing on fewer priority areas, given the impossibility of 
having a real impact on all seven priorities of the EU strategy 
with the 719 million euro available over seven years under 
the Development Cooperation instrument (DCI). The EU does 
make differentiated priorities by country, but still there are 
difficult issues of assuring real effectiveness, going beyond 
‘ticking the boxes’ indicated by the Strategy. We support the 
present move towards according higher priority to education 
programmes.
15. Assistance is most needed in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The 
EU has some leverage on the dire conditions in these countries 
through its sectoral budget support programmes. The impact of 
the economic crisis might, in combination with other security-
related factors, even destabilise Tajikistan, which justifies the 
new social policy orientated programme of the EU. The case for 
conditional budget support to these two countries is in principle 
strong, but there should be no illusions over the difficulties 
in  securing effective specification and implementation of the 
conditions. Analysis of the results of these conditional grants 
should be published. The EU has every interest in fostering 
donor coordination on the spot, especially with regard to these 
budget support programmes, and this should clearly be with EU 
member states and the rest of the donor community. Assistance 
allocated to energy-rich and fast developing Kazakhstan should 
be mainly confined to education and support to civil society, 
while Astana is in a position to buy into European expertise for 
many policy advice needs. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are 
only marginally receptive to EU assistance initiatives, where 
the EU would do well to focus on education for the time being.
16. The Commission has established a comprehensive project 
monitoring system for its aid programmes, but the results 
have not been published. The EU should create a database of 
monitoring reports to be made available on the Commission’s 
website in the interests of transparency and accountability. 
There is also a case for administrative separation of project 
evaluation from project operations to further guarantee 
objective analyses. The European Parliament should 
strengthen its oversight role in scrutinising EU Commission 
assistance to Central Asia, requesting more adequate analysis 
and monitoring assessments than so far made available. 
17. The administration of funds for civil society should 
be simplified, especially for small projects, staffing at the 
delegations needs to be strengthened, with the contracting of 
projects to experienced and well-established NGOs with a strong 
presence on the ground. For small projects the requirement 
of co-funding and complex procurement restrictions should be 
scrapped, and ultra-simplified procedures adopted for mini-
projects for civil society through the EIDHR. The BISTRO 
programme formerly used by the Commission in Russia and 
Ukraine could be revived. 
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About EUCAM
The Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior 
(FRIDE), Spain, in co-operation with the Centre for European Policy Studies 
(CEPS), Belgium, has launched a joint project entitled “EU Central Asia 
Monitoring (EUCAM)”. The (EUCAM) initiative is an 18-month research and 
awareness-raising exercise supported by several EU member states and civil 
society organisations which aims: 
- to raise the profile of the EU-Central Asia Strategy; 
- to strengthen debate about the EU-Central Asia relationship and the role of 
the Strategy in that relationship; 
- to enhance accountability through the provision of high quality information 
and analysis; 
- to promote mutual understanding by deepening the knowledge within 
European and Central Asian societies about EU policy in the region; and 
- to develop ‘critical’ capacity within the EU and Central Asia through the 
establishment of a network that links communities concerned with the role of 
the EU in Central Asia.
EUCAM focuses on four priority areas in order to find a mix between the broad 
political ambitions of the Strategy and the narrower practical priorities of EU 
institutions and member state assistance programmes:
• Democracy and Human Rights 
• Security and Stability 
• Energy and Natural Resources 
• Education and Social Relations 
EUCAM will produce the following series of publications:
 - A bi-monthly newsletter on EU-Central Asia relations will be produced and 
distributed broadly by means of an email list server using the CEPS and FRIDE 
networks. The newsletter contains the latest documents on EU-Central Asia 
relations, up-to-date information on the EU’s progress in implementing the 
Strategy and developments in Central Asian countries.
 - Policy briefs will be written by permanent and ad hoc Working Group 
members. The majority of the papers examine issues related to the four core 
themes identified above, with other papers commissioned in response to 
emerging areas beyond the main themes.
 - Commentaries on the evolving partnership between the EU and the states 
of Central Asia will be commissioned reflecting specific developments in the 
EU-Central Asian relationship. 
 - A final monitoring report of the EUCAM Expert Working Group will be 
produced by the project rapporteurs. 
This monitoring exercise is implemented by an Expert Working Group, 
established by FRIDE and CEPS. The group consists of experts from the 
Central Asian states and the members countries of the EU. In addition to 
expert meetings, several public seminars will be organised for a broad 
audience including EU representatives, national officials and legislators, the 
local civil society community, media and other stakeholders. 
EUCAM is sponsored by the Open Society Institute (OSI) and the 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The project is also supported 
by the Czech Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Spanish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and the United Kingdom Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office.
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